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In mid-October, the UN lifted its three-year economic embargo against Haiti, which should in turn
open the floodgates to emergency assistance from foreign governments and multilateral lending
institutions. The expected influx of aid will provide immediate relief for Haiti's poor, and may help
jump-start the economy after three years of economic decline. But in the medium to long term,
economic recovery will greatly depend on the government's ability to attract foreign investment
back to the island, a prospect that may prove difficult given the general distrust among business
groups toward President Jean Bertrand Aristide.
After the Haitian military overthrew President Aristide's civilian government in September 1991,
the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) declared an economic embargo against
Haiti to force the army to relinquish power and allow the Aristide administration to return to office.
In addition, in June of this year, the US imposed unilateral economic sanctions against Haiti that
greatly worsened the effects of the international embargo on the economy. Among other things, the
US barred commercial flights to and from Haiti and imposed a ceiling of US$50 per month on the
amount that Haitian residents in the US were allowed to send to their relatives on the island. The
limit on family remittances particularly hurt the economy, since financial assistance from Haitians
working in the US has traditionally been an economic mainstay, with an estimated US$250 million in
such remittances sent to the country each year. After June, the flow of dollars from the US dropped
by more than 50%, according to estimates by local economists.
The international embargo and the US sanctions have had a devastating effect on the Haitian
economy. Like most Latin American and Caribbean countries, Haiti had already suffered greatly
from the economic crisis that gripped the region during the 1980s. According to the UN's Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), from 1981-1990 the country registered a
cumulative decline in GDP of 3.8%. By 1991, the economy had begun to rebound, albeit only slightly,
with a 0.6% rate of growth reported that year. But once the UN-OAS embargo began, the economy
tumbled into an unprecedented crisis. In 1991 and 1992, the GDP plummeted by 10.5% and 11%,
respectively, bringing the cumulative decline for those two years to 19.7%, according to ECLAC
estimates. And, by year-end 1994, the total drop in GDP for the three years since the 1991 military
coup could reach nearly 30%, according to some projections. The economic crisis in turn immensely
aggravated poverty in Haiti, given that more than 70% of the economically active population is now
out of work or without a full-time job.
In addition, a severe scarcity of even the most basic goods ushered in an inflationary spiral that has
crippled the purchasing power of most Haitians. According to ECLAC, the consumer price index
increased from 6.6% in 1991 to 18% in 1992, and then skyrocketed to 60% in 1993. Even before the
embargo began, per capita income in Haiti was estimated at about US$375 per year, making Haiti
the poorest country in the hemisphere. At present, however, per capita annual income is estimated
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at only US$260, meaning that most Haitians are now surviving on about US$0.70 per day. In fact,
according to the United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF), an average of 500 children die in Haiti
each week from illnesses caused by malnutrition. Consequently, one of the most pressing tasks
facing the Aristide administration which finally returned to office on Oct. 15 will be to provide
immediate relief to the country's poorest groups and begin to reactivate the economy. To finance
the country's emergency needs, the government is counting on a massive influx of foreign aid, made
possible by the lifting of both the US sanctions and the international embargo in mid-October.
“Aid is crucial," said Michael Barnes one of President Aristide's chief advisors in a reference to
negotiations with the US and multilateral lending institutions to provide emergency assistance to
the country. "All of the important efforts of the last few days will be in vain unless the international
community can jump-start this new government and the economy of Haiti."
Before returning to Haiti, President Aristide had already successfully negotiated an agreement with
the US government and the World Bank to coordinate an international aid program for Haiti that
will provide US$500 million in assistance to the country during the next 12-15 months. Under the
program, some 15 nations have pledged contributions totalling US$77 million that will be used to
repay most of Haiti's outstanding debts to the multilateral lending institutions. That, in turn, will
free up at least US$230 million in loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). For its part, the US will provide about
US$200 million in direct assistance to Haiti, which, combined with the funds from the banks, will
finance a series of projects aimed at reducing unemployment and reactivating the economy. A
large percentage of the loans will be used for massive public-works programs, especially the repair
of highways, bridges, and ports, plus the construction of schools and health centers, given that
infrastructure has deteriorated markedly since the 1991 coup.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates that just the projects it plans to
fund independent of those financed by the multilateral institutions will provide employment for
more than 50,000 Haitians in 1995. In addition, USAID will maintain its food programs for poor
Haitians in the short to medium term. Under the program, the US has been providing one million
meals per day to poor citizens, and USAID now plans to expand that number to 1.3 million per
day. Finally, some of the planned assistance will also be aimed at rebuilding the economy in the
long term. In fact, the US government has promised to continue providing about US$100 million in
development assistance annually during the next five years for large-scale investment projects. And,
the IDB is expected to approve loans to help pay for vitally needed imports such as tires for busses,
fertilizers, seeds, construction materials, and water-treatment equipment. The aid programs should
immediately alleviate the gravest problems caused by the embargo, and spur economic activity in
the short to medium term. Nevertheless, full economic recovery will largely depend on whether the
Aristide administration and the next government that takes office in 1996 are capable of attracting
domestic and foreign private investment to sustain growth in the long term. In the mid-1980s, Haiti
enjoyed a boom in investment in the manufacturing sector, as foreign investors flooded into the
Port-au-Prince area either to set up assembly plants directly or to contract local investors to set up
operations.
Haiti's close proximity to the US, combined with its abundant and cheap labor force, made
investment conditions ideal. An estimated 80,000 jobs were generated in the manufacturing
sector during the 1980s, according to Caribbean-Latin American Action, a Washington group that
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encourages investment in the region. Nonetheless, the vast majority of foreign companies have
completely left the island and set up operations in neighboring countries throughout the Caribbean,
and in Central America. The number of US companies in Haiti directly involved in exports, for
example, fell from about 250 in 1990 to just 120 by the end of 1992, and many of the remaining firms
have since pulled out, according to Caribbean-Latin American Action. To attract new companies
and especially to convince firms that previously operated in Haiti to return to the country the
government will have to provide major incentives, since most business representatives are highly
skeptical about President Aristide's populist program.
Most business groups are unlikely to consider new investments in Haiti until government policies
become clear. "I'm not very optimistic," Carlos Perez, a high-level executive with AJA Electronics
in Miami, recently told the Journal of Commerce. Until the company canceled its contracts after
the 1991 coup, AJA indirectly employed about 2,000 Haitians by contracting local producers to
make such goods as switches, transformers, and inducers. "Based on what I've seen, I don't think
the powers that be in Haiti will be very friendly to business," said Perez. "There must be some
considerations, some incentives, before we move back in."
In fact, other business leaders interviewed by the Journal of Commerce were even more direct in
their criticism of President Aristide, although most said they hoped that the return to civilian rule
in Haiti would lead to a stable business climate in the country in the medium to long term. "We in
the US have misunderstood the Aristide question, which isn't an issue of the evil military versus the
good Mr. Aristide," said Charles Mckay, president of International Industrial Exporters Inc., which
had previously handled large- scale contracts in Haiti. "Mr. Aristide isn't any more the answer to
Haiti's problems than is the military. But his return to power is worth the cost of the US military
incursion if it fosters a resumption of free trade and the sale of US goods and services."

-- End --
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